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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Board contests that this Court has jurisdiction because
Appellants failed to file a timely notice of appeal.

However, if

this Court has has jurisdiction over this appeal it is pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j), not Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(i) as stated in Culbertson's statement of jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.

Did Culbertson's failure to file a notice of appeal

within thirty days from the April 14, 1995 final Order preclude
this Court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over this
appeal?
Standard of Review: This issue is raised for the first time
on appeal because it involves a question solely of the
jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals to hear this appeal.
The Utah Court of Appeals denied a prior motion for summary
disposition on this issue "because one of the issues has been
deferred pending plenary consideration of the case . . ."

Order,

October 17, 1996; Judge Pamela T. Greenwood.
Subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law and a
correction of error standard is utilized.

Baker v. Angus. 910

P.2d 427, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
B.

Did the trial court err in dismissing all claims
1

relating to the vacation ordinance based on Culbertson's
attorney's in court waiver, abandonment and/or acquiescence of
their challenge to the vacation ordinance?
Standard of Review for Summary Judgment: "Because summary
judgment is a conclusion of law, we give no deference to the
trial court's conclusions of law but review those conclusions for
correctness."

Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Med. Center, 791

P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1990) .

However, the standard of review for

questions of waiver is different.

In State v. Pena, 869 P.2d

932, 938 (Utah 1994) the Utah Supreme Court stated that "waiver
is a highly fact-dependent question, one that we cannot
profitably review de novo in every case because we cannot hope to
work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of such
decisions."

Further,

vx

[t]he judge of that court is therefore

considered to be in the best position to assess the credibility
of witnesses and to derive a sense of the proceedings as a whole,
something an appellate court cannot hope to garner from a cold
record."

Id. at 936.

Therefore, a measure of discretion should

be afforded the trial court's order based on waiver.
This issue was presented to the trial court in the Board's
answer to the second amended complaint and memorandum in support
of its motion for judgment on the pleadings or in the alternative
2

for summary judgment.
C.

(R. 320; 340; 343).

Can the trial court's order be sustained under the

doctrine of invited error?
Standard of review: Because the doctrine of invited error
can only be raised on appeal, there is no applicable standard of
review.

The Board believes the application of the doctrine in

the instant case is a matter of law.
D.

Does Culbertson7s failure to present arguments attacking

the validity of the vacation ordinance to the trial court by
motion or otherwise preclude appellate consideration of her
arguments?
Standard of review: Because the failure to raise or properly
present issues to the trial court will be raised first on appeal,
there is no applicable standard of review.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Copies of the above-cited law are attached as Exhibit A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from the dismissal of certain claims in an

amended complaint brought by Appellants Alayna J. Culbertson, J.
3

Blaine Johnson, Eva C. Johnson and Diane Pearl Meibos
(hereinafter individually and collectively referred to as
"Culbertson") against the Board of County Commissioners and
individually named commissioners arising out of the partial
vacation and closure of an adjacent roadway.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
On June 20, 1994 Culbertson filed a verified complaint

against the Board of County Commissioners seeking to enjoin the
vacation of North Union Boulevard.

(R. 1-20).

Culbertson also

filed an Order to Show Cause (R. 29) and a memorandum in support
of temporary restraining order.

(R. 3 6-43).

The Board opposed

the motion through its memorandum (R. 47-76) and the trial court
denied Culbertson7s motion for a temporary restraining order.
(R. 35; 124-126).
On July 14, 1994 Culbertson filed an amended complaint. (R.
89-112). The Board of County Commissioners filed an answer to the
amended complaint on July 27, 1994.

(R. 113-120).

The parties

then conducted some discovery out of which arose disputes
immaterial to this appeal.
Culbertson next moved for leave to file a second amended
complaint on November 23, 1994.

(R. 182-183).

The Board

opposed Culbertson's motion for leave to file an amended
4

complaint. (R. 194-202) .

The trial court heard oral arguments on

Culbertson's motion on January 30, 1995. (R. 818). At the oral
argument then counsel for Culbertson made the following
representations to the trial court:
The reason we are here before you today, your
Honor, is not to attack the ordinance. While
the original complaint may have those
allegations in it, your Honor, it is a mess
out there. And what we are here today is
asking the county to enforce its own
ordinance. If you look at the amended
complaint, basically paragraph 33 on, you
will see that we are not attacking - - w e are
not attacking that ordinance in the amended
complaint.
(R. 840)
Later at the January 30, 1995 hearing the trial court
stated:
I'm going to allow you to amend if you so
choose . . . But it will only be as to
injunctive relief -- I guess not injunctive - I guess it is injunctive relief you're
asking me on one hand part of that where a
suit to force the county to do something,
i.e. to enforce their own ordinances, right?
MR. M. OLSEN: Right.
(R. 842)
At that point, Mr. Nick J. Colessides, the attorney then
representing the Board, requested the following clarification
from the trial court:
5

MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, clarification for
just one moment.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, as we have viewed
these, this is sort - - w e are dealing with a
moving target. As I see the second amended
complaint they are going to be filing another
version of it and wherein, as I understand
it, they do not seek to invalidate the
ordinance, am I correct?
THE COURT: That's what was represented.
MR. COLESSIDES: And that issue is dead.
THE COURT: Plus I have told them they would
amend to not include damages and so only as
to the injunctive relief as to have the
county enforce its own ordinance, that will
be the limitation on the amendments.
(R. 843) .
The trial court granted Culbertson7s motion for leave to
file an amended complaint.

(R. 294-295).

However, the trial

court stated from the bench that he would only allow Culbertson
to seek injunctive relief and not challenge the vacation
ordinance or seek monetary damages against the Board or
individually named commissioners. (R. 918-923)
On February 13, 1995 Culbertson filed a second amended
complaint which did not comply with the limitations expressly
pronounced by the trial court and agreed upon by Culbertson7s

6

counsel. (R. 296-311).

On February 22, 1995 the Board of County

Commissioners filed an answer to the second amended complaint.
(R. 312-323).
The Board moved for judgment on the pleadings, or, in the
alternative for summary judgment, on February 27, 1995.
328).

(R. 326-

The Board submitted a memorandum and affidavit in support

of its motion.

(R.

329-374).

On March 1, 1995 Culbertson again

moved for injunctive relief pursuant to Rule 65A of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.

(R.

377-378).

Culbertson's motion

was supported by a memorandum, exhibits as well as affidavits.
(R. 379-437).

Culbertson also submitted a memorandum in

opposition to the Board's motion for summary judgment.

(R.

461).

The Board submitted its reply memorandum on March 16,

1996.

(R.

440-

597). On March 29, 1995 a hearing was held on the

Board's motion for summary judgment on Culbertson's motion for an
injunction.

(R. 637).

The following exchange took place at the March 29, 1995
hearing with Culbertson's counsel present:
[THE COURT]. . . I'm going to dismiss this
matter without prejudice -- without
prejudice, that is emphasized -- allowing you
to exhaust whatever means you wish to, your
administrative remedies, and then have leave,
if after that time there has been no
resolution to your satisfaction, through the
7

-- through Mr. Jones, through the board of
planning -- the Planning Commission, through
the Board of County Commissioners and the
Board of Adjustment, then you do have leave,
without prejudice to refile the matter.
It is my indication from listening to you,
Mr. Colessides, that you're maintaining that
it is a continuing problem and that there
will be no waiver of time, and your position
taken before me today, and I expect no
contrary position be taken in further
litigation -MR. COLESSIDES: That's correct with the
exception of the vacation ordinance.
THE COURT: And the vacation ordinance is
subject to a previous order that I made.
(R. 921-922)
In a minute entry dated March 29, 1995 the trial court ruled
that the complaint was dismissed without prejudice.

(R. 637).

However, the trial court signed and entered a written final
order, consistent with the trial court's statements from the
bench, which dismissed with prejudice ''plaintiffs' claims as
contained within plaintiffs' second amended complaint, relating
to that certain Salt Lake County Ordinance as passed by the Board
of County Commissioners . . . dated August 10, 1995 . . ."(R.
648) .
The Board's attorney, on April 1, 1995, sent Culbertson's
attorney the proposed order dismissing claims relating to the
8

vacation ordinance with prejudice and the remaining claims
without prejudice.

(R. 644-645) . On April 10, 1995 Culbertson

filed an objection to an order and requested a hearing on the
objection.

(R. 639-643).

On April 14, 1995 the Board submitted

a notice of submission of order.

(R.

644-646).

On April 14,

1995 the trial court signed and entered the order and no notice
of appeal was filed until September 27, 1995. (R.
708).

647-649; 703-

On April 21, 1995 Culbertson submitted a notice to submit

and request for oral argument.

(R.

650-651).

On May 18, 1995 the trial court in a minute entry denied
Culbertson's objections to the order.

(R.

652-653).

On August

30, 1995 the trial court in a minute entry directed the Board to
draft an order denying the objections.

(R.

678). On September

26, 1995 the trial court entered an order denying Culbertson's
objections.

(R.

701-702).

on September 27, 1995.

Culbertson filed a notice of appeal

(R. 703-708).

On August 13, 1996 the Board filed a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's appeal.

The Utah Court of Appeals denied that

portion of the motion relating to Culbertson7s failure to file a
timely notice of appeal noting that "one of the issues has been
deferred pending plenary consideration of the case."
October 17, 1996 signed by Judge Pamela T. Greenwood.
9

Order,

C.

Disposition in the trial court.
Culbertson's second amended complaint was dismissed in part

with prejudice and in part without prejudice.

Claims relating to

the vacation ordinance were dismissed with prejudice, the
remaining claims were dismissed without prejudice.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because the Board disagrees with a number of Culbertson's
statement of facts, the Board states the facts relevant to this
appeal as follows:
1. Culbertson and the other parties are owners of real
property adjacent to a road named North Union Avenue.
2.

(R. 1-2).

On February 15, 1994 Hermes Associates, Ltd. ("Hermes")

filed a Petition for Street Vacation seeking to vacate North
Union Avenue.
3.

(R. 489).

Hermes filed the petition as owners of land abutting

North Union Avenue. (R. 489). Fort Union Associates later became
the owner of the land owned by Hermes.
4.

(R. 347).

Fort Union petitioned to vacate the road in order to

facilitate the expansion of a shopping center. (R.
5.

358-359).

The Board published the required statutory notices of a

hearing to be held on the proposed road vacation.
353) .
10

(R. 347; 352-

6.

On May 25, 1994 the Board held a duly noticed public

hearing on the petition to vacate North Union. (R. 347).
7.

Culbertson's attorney was present and participated in

the public hearing.
8.

(R. 348; 359-362).

The Board voted 2-1 to vacate a portion of North Union

and close a twenty-five foot section of North Union which was
directly in front of Culbertson's residence. (R. 347; 362). The
road was formerly thirty three feet wide in front of Culbertson's
property. (R. 5 ) . The eight feet in front of Fort Union's
property was vacated.

(R. 157-160).

The Board refers the Court

to page 70 of the record which, in its view, presents the
clearest map and visual illustration of the action taken by the
Board.
9.

(R. 70).
The Board voted to permanently close, but not vacate, a

twenty-five foot section of North Union directly abutting the
Culbertson property. (R. 362).
10.

On July 13, 1994 the Board signed and published the

vacation ordinance as Ordinance No. 1270.
11.

(R. 481-485).

Initially, Hermes planned on giving Culbertson a

twenty-five foot easement on the west of Culbertson's property to
provide Culbertson access to her property.

(R. Ill).

In a

further effort to accommodate the adjacent landowners the Board
11

decided to make the access to the west of the property a public
right-of-way rather than a shared private easement.
12.

(R. 159).

On August 10, 1994 the Board signed and published a

corrected version of the vacation ordinance as Ordinance No.
1275.

Ordinance #1275 corrected the legal description contained

in the prior ordinance, Ordinance #1270.
13.

(R. 354-357).

After the trial court dismissed Culbertson's claims in

this case, on April 15, 1995 Alayna Culbertson and Diane Pearl
Meibos filed another verified complaint against the Board of
County Commissioners and Ken Jones, Case No. 950905166
challenging inter

alia

the Board's grant of roadway exemptions

for 1070 East and again seeking to litigate the question of "what
constitutes reasonable and adequate access to plaintiff's
property."
In addition to the Board's statement of facts, many of
Culbertson's statement of facts are incorrect or incomplete.

The

following statements of Culbertson are sufficiently material and
incomplete or inaccurate as to warrant a specific response:
1. Culbertson states in paragraph 8 that the vote closing
North Union Avenue left no outlet to any other roadway.

At all

times the Board provided Culbertson with access to her property
from what was formerly North Union Avenue.
12

First, Hermes

proposed a shared private easement to the west of Culbertson's
property to provide access through North Union Avenue.

(R. 20).

Then, to further accommodate Culbertson the Board made the
roadway a public roadway rather than a shared private easement,
which Culbertson concedes is now 1070 East.

(R. 159; Culbertson

Brief, page 11).
2.

Statement of Fact #9 argues that Culbertson did not

receive proper notice of the Board's action.

The Board has

included in the record the notice it gave on the road vacation.
(R. 352-353) .

Culbertson contests whether the notice was proper

or adequate, however, that argument is not properly before the
Court as is argued by the Board in its brief.
3.

Statement of Fact #10 and #13 fails to indicate that the

Board accurately represented the status of the Ordinance stating:
"The ordinance as proposed when signed and published will vacate
a portion of a street located in Salt Lake County known as North
Union Avenue . . ."

(R. 49). Thus, the Board clearly and

unequivocally stated that the ordinance had not yet been signed
and published and noted that it "will" vacate North Union Avenue.
4.

Statement of Fact #16 is incorrect and contradicts the

record.

Culbertson states that the Board did not plead waiver:

The Board's answer states (R. 118) "Defendants affirmatively
13

allege that plaintiffs have waived and/or is estopped to maintain
their claims as asserted in the complaint."

Further, Culbertson

omits any reference to the fact that the Board pled the statute
of limitations when the limitations period was implicated; in the
answer to the second amended complaint.

(R. 316)("As a further

affirmative defense defendants assert that plaintiffs7 attack
upon the passage of the vacation ordinance is time barred, more
particularly provided for by § 17-27-1001 Utah Code Annotated,
1991 Replacement.")
5.

Statement of Fact # 18 states the Board held another

hearing was held on the road vacation on August 10, 1994.
citation to the record is provided.
vacation was held on May 25, 1995.

No

The hearing on the road
The subsequently enacted

ordinances were passed at public meetings.
6.

Statement of Fact #19 argues that the 1070 East does not

comply with the County's Standards for Roadway Development.

This

is a legal conclusion which the Board disputes, which is not
relevant to this appeal and which is not properly before the
Court.
7.

Statement of Fact # 20 alleging Hermes built into the

public roadway similarly argues points not relevant to this
appeal and not properly before the Court.
14

8.

Culbertson omits pertinent facts relating to her motion

for leave to file an amended complaint in Statement of Fact #22.
Specifically, Culbertson does not mention the explicit
limitations the trial court placed on any subsequent complaint.
Additionally Culbertson omits any mention that the subsequently
submitted complaint did not comply with either her own attorney's
representations or the trial court's specific directives.

See

Board's Brief, Course of Proceedings.
9.

Paragraph #3 0 improperly argues that the trial court did

not rule on Culbertson's objections prior to signing the final
April 14, 1995 Order.

This is a legal conclusion and not a fact.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider
Culbertson's appeal because Culbertson did not file a notice of
appeal within thirty days after entry of final judgment.

The

objections Culbertson submitted prior to entry of judgment were
not post-judgment motions and did not toll the thirty day time
limit for filing a notice of appeal.
The trial court's Order dismissing all claims relating to
the road vacation ordinance was properly based on the open court
waiver, abandonment and/or acquiescence of such claims by
Culbertson's attorney.

Culbertson claims the Board did not raise
15

the affirmative defenses of waiver and statute of limitations.
However, the record clearly shows that these defenses were in
fact raised in a timely fashion.
In the alternative, the order can be sustained under the
doctrine of invited error.

Finally, Culbertson's renewed attacks

on the vacation ordinance on appeal are improper.

Culbertson's

arguments are either raised for the first time on appeal, or were
never presented to the trial court by motion for decision.
Accordingly Culbertson's attacks on the vacation ordinance are
not properly before the Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT LACKS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION BECAUSE CULBERTSON
DID NOT FILE A TIMELY NOTICE OF APPEAL.
The issue before the Court is whether Culbertson's
objections submitted prior to the entry of judgment tolled the
thirty day time limit for filing a notice of appeal.

Culbertson

argues that her objections were, in reality, a Rule 52 motion
under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The record establishes

that Culbertson submitted an objection, not a post-judgment
motion, and that therefore she failed to file her notice of claim
in a timely manner.
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Utah appellate courts have consistently noted that "we
cannot take jurisdiction over an untimely appeal."
Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Nielson v.

Further, "[w]hen

a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the
authority to dismiss the action."

Varian-Eimac, Inc. v.

Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that "the notice of appeal . . .

shall be filed with the clerk

of the trial court within 3 0 days after the date of entry of the
judgment or order appealed from."

Rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules of

Appellate Procedure recognizes that a judgment or order is not
final for purposes of appeal if a proper post-judgment motion is
filed under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rule 4(b) provides in relevant part that:
If a timely motion under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court
by any party (1) for judgment under Rule
50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make
additional findings of fact, whether or not
an alteration of the judgment would be
required if the motion is granted; (3) under
Rule 59 to alter or amend the judgment; or
(4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time
for appeal for all parties shall run from the
entry of the order denying a new trial or
granting or denying any other such motion.
The record shows that Culbertson did not file a notice of
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appeal within thirty days of entry of the trial court's final
Order.

Nor did Culbertson submit a proper post-judgment motion

under Rule 4(b) which would effectively toll the time period in
which to file a notice of appeal.
The trial court entered the Order on April 14, 1995.
647-649).

(R.

Culbertson filed a notice of appeal on September 27,

1995, which purported to appeal from the April 14, 1995 Order.
(R.

706-708) .

On April 10, 1995, four days before entry of

judgment, Culbertson submitted an "Objection to Order."
641).

(R. 63 9-

On April 14, 1995 the Board submitted a "Notice of

Submission of Order" which stated in part: "In a letter dated
April 4, 1995, plaintiffs' counsel advised the undersigned that
he was unwilling to approve the order as submitted on the basis
that the 'Court did not dismiss Plaintiffs' claims with
prejudice7."

(R. 644-646).

Based on the record before it on

April 14, 1995, the trial court signed and entered the Order.
(R.

647-649).
The April 14, 1995 Order was a final order under Rule 4 of

the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Culbertson should have

filed a notice of appeal within thirty days of the Order, but
failed to do so.

Having failed to file a timely notice of

appeal, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the
18

appeal.
Culbertson has argued that the objection submitted prior to
the entry of the April 14, 1995 order constitutes a Rule 52(b)
motion tolling the thirty day time limit.

Culbertson relies on

Zions First Nat, Bank v. C'est Bon Venture, 613 P.2d 515 (Utah
1980) in support of her position.

Dictum in Zions states that:

If a Rule 52(b) motion is made before
judgment and presents a substantial question,
and the motion is not disposed of, either
expressly or by necessary implication, the
running of the time for taking an appeal is
suspended under Rule 73 (a) until the court
disposes of the motion.
Zions. 613 P.2d at 517.
Culbertson's reliance on Zions is misplaced.

First, the

Court in Zions found that the disputed judgment was final.

The

Court overturned the trial court's granting of an untimely Rule
52 motion in part because "the judgment . . . [had] the effect of
denying the oral motion."

Id. at 517. Similarly in the instant

case, the trial court's ruling after the submission of
Culbertson's objections effectively denied the objections.
Second, in the instant case, the objection was disposed of,
either expressly or by necessary implication.

Culbertson's

objection was submitted four days prior to the entry of judgment.
The Board's own notice of submission of the order alerted the
19

trial court to the exact nature of Culbertson's objection.

The

trial court signed and entered the order in light of Culbertson's
objection and the Board's explanation as to why Culbertson
refused to approve the order as to form.
Third, Culbertson's "objection" cannot constitute a Rule
52(b) motion under Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 P.2d 320 (Utah
1991).

In Neerinas. the Utah Supreme Court noted that the

purpose of Rule 52(b) motions are "to permit the filing of
motions for amendment or making additional findings of fact,
which, pursuant to Rule 52(a), are not required in ruling upon
motions for summary judgment."

Jd. at 322.

Because no

additional findings of fact can be required in a trial court's
grant of summary judgment, Culbertson cannot claim her objection
was a Rule 52(b) motion.

Therefore, Zions is inapplicable

because Culbertson's objection cannot, under Neerinas. be
construed as Rule 52(b) motion.

Under DeBry, Culbertson cannot

claim her objection was a post-judgment motion, having been
submitted prior to the entry of judgment.
This Court refused to find that objections submitted prior
to the entry of judgment suspended the finality of the judgment
in Morgan v. Morgan, 875 P.2d 563 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)
denied

875 P.2d 563 (Utah 1994) .
20

cert,

The Court stated in part that:

defendant argues that, the summary judgment
was not a final order because her objections
. thereto were not: expressly ruled upon.
Defendant submitted timely objections to
plaintiff's proposed order under Rule 4504(2) of the Code of Judicial
Administration, which provides that such
objections be submitted within five days
after service of the proposed order. After
the five-day period had expired, the trial
court signed plaintiff's proposed order
without expressly ruling on defendant's
objections, The objections were before the
trial court; therefore, we believe the court
implicitly denied plaintiff's objections. In
any event, "the time for filing [a] notice of
appeal begins to run when the judgment is
entered . . ."
Id. •?.*- C.CA ~
Sirn; i e *

"• 'citations omitted) .
- • - ••

•: ' •

•*.;:

' • .

e

objections which were either implicitly or explicitly denied by
the tr ial court.

Despite Culbertson's written objections that

claims relating to the vacation ordinance were met properly
dismissed with prejudice, the trial court proceeded to dismiss
the c] ai ins w:i tl 1 pre ji idice based, :i i i pai: L , « : i i the representations
of Culbertson's attorney.

The trial court's order resolved the

objections and the oi: der w a s final.
The subsequent actions of the ti; :i a 1 coi u: t: cons:i deri rig tl HE ;
objection did iee have the effect of suspending the finality of
the ji ldgme

: ^1 court, on M a y 1 8, 1 995, issued a minute
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entry denying Culbertson's objection and reaffirmed the trial
court's intent that claims relating to the vacation ordinance
were dismissed with prejudice.

(R. 652). On August 28, 1995 the

trial court held a hearing on Culbertson's objection1.
858).

(R. 854-

At the hearing, the trial court directed the Board's

attorney to prepare an Order denying the objections but stated:
"Any the issue, as to timeliness, they can take that up with the
appellate courts."

(R. 857).

Therefore, the trial court went

out of his way to indicate that he was not ruling on the
timeliness of the notice of appeal or whether a notice should
have been filed after the April 14, 1995 Order.
On September 26, 1995 the trial court entered a written
order denying Culbertson's objections to the April 14, 1995
Order.

(R. 701-702).

The next day Culbertson filed a notice of

appeal, nearly five months after entry of the final Order.

(R.

706-708).
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this appeal
because Culbertson failed to file a timely notice of appeal.
Culbertson's objection was submitted prior to the entry of the

1

At that hearing, Ms. Meibos represented herself. Mr.
Olsen had withdrawn as counsel for all the parties. Therefore,
the other plaintiffs were unrepresented at that hearing.
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April 14, 1995 order.

The objections were, therefore, not post-

judgment motions which tolled the thirty day time limit under
Full' J nt iliM III ili ihules ol Appe I I at e Procedure.
Culbertson's objection is properly characterized as an
objection pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial
Admin :i strati on

i i : -t a s a ]:: c ist judgmei it m o t i oi i p u r suant: Rule 52 (b)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Case law construing post-

judgment "objections" as post-judgment motions are not
applicable.

For instance/ in DeBry v

Co. , 828 P. 2d 52J,
t

Fidel ity

522-523 ("tar. C\ . Apr

• .. .

,L

Nat

Ti11e Ins.

)2) the Court stated

\, ,\,

R motion filed wi thin

ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness
of the court's findings and conclusions in properly treated as a
post j I ldgment moti on i mder ed thei Ri J

'.

) or

However, this :i s not a case where a party inadvertently
submitted objections after the entry of judgment.

Culbertson's

after-the-fact characterization of the objections submitted prioi
to the entry of judgment would convert every objection into a
R/i i] e 52 (b) mot i : >i i

T l i :i s i n t i in I woi il d • : T eate uncertainty and

confusion surrounding the finality of judgments and orders.
At oral argument, Ms. Meibos, one of the named parties
conceded that: u we '

*
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n

April 14th was the first week of May, we called the court and
they said, yes, you had signed the order."

(R. 856).

In

addition, "a party to lawsuit is on constructive notice of the
contents of the court record and has a duty to be aware of what
the trial court does."

Reeves v. Steinfeldt, 915 P.2d 1073, 1077

n. 6 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).

Finally, Culbertson was represented

by counsel during the entire thirty day period and beyond.
Counsel withdrew on July 3, 1995 (R. 654) well after the thirty
day time period had passed.

Therefore, it cannot be said that

Culbertson was confused because she was a lay person untrained in
the nuances of post-judgment motion practice2.
There is no policy or legal rationale for treating
objections submitted prior to the entry of judgment the same as
post-judgment motions.

Motions and objections serve separate and

distinct purposes under the Rules of Civil Procedure and Code of
Judicial Administration.

Objections are submitted prior to the

trial court's receipt of the proposed order under Rule 4-504.

No

provision is made for hearings on objections to proposed orders

2

In fact, Ms. Meibos sent a notice of appeal to the
Board's attorney on May 14, 1995 (R. 673-675) and apparently
decided not to file that particular notice of appeal. (R. 856).
No notice of appeal appears in the court record in or around May
14, 1995.
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u n d e r R u l e 4-504 .

C o n v e r s e l y , specific provisi ons a r e set fox: th

u n d e r R u l e 4-501(3) f o r h e a r i n g m o t i o n s .

While objections

j riadv ertei it 1 } serv ed af te i the e n t r y o t j u d g m e n t m a y b e c o n s t r u e d
as a p o s t - j u d g m e n t m o t i o n 3 , t h e r e is n o r e a s o n t o c o n s t r u e
o b j e c t i o n s s u b m i t t e d p r i o r t o t h e e n t r y of judgment a s a post:
ji i d g m e n t m o t d oi i • :: -i : a Ri i] e 52 (b) mot: on
The record shows that U j the objections were submitted four
days before entry of judgment- '°^ the objections were submitted
as objections, not as a Rule?

" . -

inrjqmeTit nn I -

, .m I i )

that the plain language of the trial court's order In effect
disposed : f the :: bj ec: ti oi is

t\ i i or t riese f actors indicate

the A p r i l 1 4 , 1995 Order w a s a final order.

that

Therefore,

C u l b e r t s o n did not fi ] e a timely notice of appeal a n d this appeal
s hoi ] ] :i b e d :i s m :i s s e d f : • :i : ] a L : 1 :: : • f s i ] b j e c t m a t: t e i: j u i i s d i c t i on.
P O I N T II
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED CLAIMS RELATING TO THE
VACATION ORDINANCE BASED ON THE IN COURT WAIVER, ABANDONMENT
AND/OR ACQUIESCENCE OF THE ROAD VACATION CLAIMS BY CULBERTSON'S
ATTORNEY.
In its Apri ] ] 4, 1 995 Or der,

the trial court stated:

plaintiffs7 claims as contained within
plaintiffs7 second amended complaint,

3

See DeBry v. Fidelity Nat. Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520,
52 2 52 3 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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relating to that certain Salt Lake County
Ordinance as passed by the Board of Salt Lake
County Commissioners, to-wit, ordinance
number 1275 (corrected). dated August 10,
1995, in the records of the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office, be and the same are hereby
dismissed with prejudice . . .
(R. 648)(emphasis added).
Culbertson's challenge to the trial court's ruling fails to
identify the clearest and most obvious basis for the Order;
namely, Culbertson's attorney's open court waiver, abandonment
and acquiescence.

Culbertson's attorney's waiver renders Point

III in her brief moot.

When faced with the argument at oral

argument in the trial court, Culbertson's attorney elected to
waive and abandon the claims rather than address the arguments
posed by the Board.

Having made that election, Culbertson may

not now retreat from her position as stated by her attorney.
A client is bound by the statements of her attorney. Utah
Code Ann. § 78-51-32(2) (1996) provides that an attorney has
authority

u

to bind his client in any of the steps of an action or

proceeding by his agreement filed with the clerk or entered upon
the minutes of the court, and not otherwise."

See also John

Deere Co. v. H Equipment, Inc., 876 P.2d 880, 886 n. 11 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) and In Re Cargill. Inc.. 66 F.3d 1256, 1261 (1st Cir.
1995)("it is common ground that civil litigants are bound by
26

their attorney's tactical "judgments . . .
silence are standard fare
court

' )

-;

r-

\?>

Culbertscr. \3 bound i?y :::ie in

"abandonment and/or acquiescence o. ;ier attorney on

all claims relating uo the vacation ordinance.
Abandonment is iefined as "the intentional, unequivocal
rel i i iqu :i shment of

^--iief d t: di le f i : n: t a notl ie:i : "

Brinkerhoff. 756 P.2d 95, 38 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).

Anderson v.
Waiver is

defined as "the d ntentional relinquishment of a known right: "
Barnes v. Wood,

5 50

] 226

1 230 (Utah 2i

P. j: j: » 1 988 ) .

Culbertson/s attorney waived all claims relating to the
vacati on oi: dinance at the ora] argument on t-he motion for leave
to file an amended complaint on January '• = •,
at oral argument on March 29, 1 9 9 5 ,
Janiiriiy

<n, i uui

J.995

'?• 818-845*

and thereafter
In the

he-Mi i I'M , " "i i 11 -o t 1 :i> »n j ; < i l t » ' . i n o y niad< t h e

following statements in open court;
The reason we are here before you today, your
Honor, is not to attack the ordinance. While
the original complaint may have those
allegations i n it, your Honor, it is a mess
out there. And what w€^ are here today is
asking the county to enforce its own
ordinance. If you look at the amended
complaint, basically paragraph 33 on, you
will see that we are not attacking -- we are
not attacking that ordinance in the amended
complaint,
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Later the trial court stated:
I'm going to allow you to amend if you so
choose . . . But it will only be as to
injunctive relief -- I guess not injunctive - I guess it is injunctive relief you're
asking me on one hand part of that where a
suit to force the county to do something,
i.e. to enforce their own ordinances, right?
MR. M. OLSEN: Right.
(R. 842)
At that point, Mr. Nick J. Colessides, the attorney then
representing the Board, requested the following clarification
from the trial court:
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, clarification for
just one moment.
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. COLESSIDES: Your Honor, as we have viewed
these, this is sort -- we are dealing with a
moving target. As I see the second amended
complaint they are going to be filing another
version of it and wherein, as I understand
it, they do not seek to invalidate the
ordinance, am I correct?
THE COURT: That's what was represented.
MR. COLESSIDES: And that issue is dead.
THE COURT: Plus I have told them they would
amend to not include damages and so only as
to the injunctive relief as to have the
county enforce its own ordinance, that will
be the limitation on the amendments.
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(R. 843) .
Later, at the hearing on the Board's motion for summary
;iudqnienl

.. Mdt-1„

1l"

lllul

', I-

'. l ^

l

j/>I)

the

trial

court

ruled

as

follows:

I'm, going to dismiss this matter
- •
without prejudice -- without prejudice, that
is emphasized -- allowing you to exhaust
whatever means you wish to, your
administrative remedies, and then have leave,
if after that time there has been no
resolution to your satisfaction, through the
-- through Mr. Jones, through the board of
planning
the Planning Commission, through
the Board of County Commissioners and the
Board of Adjustment, then you do have leave,
without prejudice to refile the matter.
It is my inciication from listening to you,
Mr. Colessides, that you're maintaining that
it is a continuing problem and that there
will be no waiver of time, and. your position
taken before me today, and I expect no
contrary position be taken :in further
litigation -MR. COLESSIDES: That's correct with the
exception of the vacation ordinance.
THE COURT: And the vacation ordinance is -.subject to a previous order that I made.
(U

"^1^92

A)

Culbertson's attorney, by his affirmative representation;.:. I n
the trial court, waived and abandoned claims relating to the
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vacation ordinance at the hearing on January 30, 19954.
Culbertson's attorney affirmatively indicated that the reason he
was in court was not to attack the vacation ordinance.

(R. 840).

Counsel again affirmatively assented to the trial court's
description of his suit as only seeking to enforce the ordinance
through injunctive relief.

(R.

840). Later, when Mr.

Colessides sought clarification, Culbertson's attorney was
present.

Mr. Colessides specifically asked whether they were

going to attack the vacation ordinance and the trial court stated
"That's what was represented."

(R. 843). Mr. Colessides then

stated that the issue is dead and the trial court agreed.

4

(R.

Although Culbertson's attorney submitted, and the trial
court signed, an Order On Motion For Leave To Amend Complaint
which did not contain the limitations clearly stated by the trial
court and accepted by Culbertson (R. 294-295), the Board in its
first responsive pleading asserted waiver and/or estoppel as
defenses.
(R. 320,321). The Board then moved for the dismissal
of the road vacation claims improperly submitted based on
Culbertson's attorney's waiver of these claims. (R. 343)("in
view of the fact that the condition precedent to the filing of
the second amended complaint as ordered by the Court, was the
waiver by plaintiff of their claims relating to the validity and
passage of the Vacation Ordinance . . . " ) .
See also (R.
603)(discussing counsel's statements at January 30, 1995
hearing). The record shows that the trial court had the
transcripts of the January 30, 1995 hearing at the time it
considered the parties' position on March 29, 1995. (R.
818)(indicating transcript filed on March 27, 1995). Therefore,
the Board properly and timely raised the issue of waiver opposing
Culbertson's assertion of claims relating to the vacation
ordinance.
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843) .

o u r i n g this entire exchange, Culbertson's attorney 1 ::y

remaining silent acquiesced

.;• -he

characterization of his claims

b;y both opposi ng coi n ise] a. • r -• tr i a 1 rourt.
Culbertson's attorney was also present during the Mar •••
1995 hearing and did not object or indicate that the criai vcur:
erred i in :i ts i: <• ••*co 1 1 e e I i o n i • > I" t: h.e st:a11 is c f 11 Ie c3 ai i: ns re 1 ating to
the vacation ordinance.

The failure of Culbertson's attorney to

object or in any wa^r iissent shows that he waived, abandoned
and/or acquiesced to uir
vacation ordinance.
attorney

v :irnj s s a l

o f * • I «-a i nr: i L e l d t n i g t

t In m a d

Culbertson is bound by the conduct of her

i "u ibei tson ' :; attorney's conduct is similar to the

conduct considered in Carrier v. Pro-Tech Restoration, 90 9 P.2d
271,

275 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) cert, granted

wrv-^-

.• '

r m -k : -r--

ii • •:'•: ; - •.

920 P.2d 1194(1996)
-

•;:ia : it ..J- L .J

a trial court,'> ararr of additional peremptory challenges to a
defendant' ,

The Court stated:

Rightly or wrongly, counsel conceded that
Pleasant Grove had different interests than
Smith and Pro-Tech and did not continue to
press his argument as it pertained to
Pleasant Grove. Therefore, because plaintiff
ultimately waived her objection to the trial
court's decision granting Pleasant Grove an
additional set of peremptory challenges, we
will not a.low her to contest it on appeal.
Id. at 2 75
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The trial court properly entered an Order dismissing claims
relating to the vacation ordinance with prejudice based on
Culbertson7s attorney's open court waiver, abandonment and
acquiescence to the dismissal of such claims.
POINT III
THE BOARD DID PROPERLY AND TIMELY PLEAD BOTH WAIVER AND STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS.
Culbertson7s first point that the Board waived, by failing
to plead both waiver and statute of limitations, is inconsistent
with the record and is without merit. Culbertson contends the
Board failed to raise the defense of waiver and statute of
limitations.

First, the Board affirmatively asserted the defense

of waiver and estoppel in its answer to Culbertson7s second
amended complaint. (R. 320). Therefore, the Board did raise the
defense of waiver in a timely fashion and Culbertson's waiver of
all claims relating to the vacation ordinance was properly
considered by the trial court.
Second, the Board did plead the affirmative defense of
statute of limitations in alleging Culbertson7s failure to comply
with Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-1001 (1995) in its answer to
Culbertson7s second amended complaint.

The Answer specifically

stated: "As a further affirmative defense defendants assert that
32

p l a i n t i f f s ' attack u p o n the p a s s a g e of the vacation ordinance

i <••;

time barred, a_ more p a r t i c u l a r l y p r o v i d e d for by § 17-27-1001
jJ

Utai i ::ode An not at e< I, I! 9 9 :i Replacemei it:

(1 !

: 1t )

Because

Culbertson's first amended complaint w a s , if anything, p r e m a t u r e ,
the Board's first answer did not raise the statute of
1 i iiii t a t i o n s

I i 1 l e i l t l i = i :i i ltd i nel i n e s s

: 'f Ci il b e r t s o i l s a t t a c k

:::o: I t l le

v a c a t i o n ordinance b e c a m e an issue,, the Board raised the defense
in a timely fashion

Ev en before the filing of the amended

complaint, the Board raised the :i ssi le of noi i comp] i a nee w i tl i
U.C.A. § 17 27 1 00]

(1995) i n writino in ::.- memorandum opposing

the j:>] roposed an: lei ided comp] a :i i it,

) .

In addition, the Board raised Culbertson's w a i v e r of h e r
v a c a t i o n ordinance claims in its m e m o r a n d u m in support of its
motion for iudcirnent M M the p I oaci i ngi-'i m
summary judgment, (R, 3 3 0 ; 3 4 3 ) .

in I lu-j d I t~e'j native f<..»r

Therefore, this issue w a s

presented to the tri a ] court p r o p e r l y and Culbertson w a s given
the opportunity to respond to the argument LiidL n e r *"waived claims relatir.:{ to the vacation ordinance Cw 1 b ^ i t " s o n r f-\spi mi i^-'u

opposition.

(:-

45

in

4 54) -

.«tguiiiei)i

III li<~"i

.In r.acr:

'u* 'in* n dti'luin

in

rherefoie, Culbertson cannot n o w

claim, she did :± : ha^ ro notice of either the w a i v e r cr statute ::f
limitation argu- ^ r r

••••-.
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•

.

•.. .

p ; ... • ..

to respond to the argument.

The record shows that both

arguments were presented to the trial court in writing and that
oral argument was received on both issues.

The manner in which

both of these issues were considered comported with fundamental
notions of due process.
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT'S ALLEGED FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH RULE 52 OF THE
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IS NOT REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Assuming arguendo

that the trial court's April 15, 1995

Order did not comply with U.R.C.P. 52(a) by failing to issue a
statement of grounds for its decision, such failure is not
reversible error.

See Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844

P.2d 949, 958 n. 4 (Utah 1992) ("failure to issue a statement of
grounds is not reversible error absent unusual circumstances . .
.").

The alleged failure to comply with Rule 52 is not

reversible error in light of the fact that the record provides a
clear and legally sufficient basis upon which to base the trial
court's ruling, i.e. the waiver, abandonment and/or acquiescence
of Culbertson's attorney.
The Utah Court of Appeals has stated that "on review . . .
[the appellate courts] are not limited to written findings, and
may properly examine findings expressed solely from the bench or
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contained in other court documents, such as court memoranda."
Merriam v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1177 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The transcripts of the hearings combined with the memoranda
submitted to the trial court provide a clear and proper basis for
the dismissal of the claims relating to the road vacation
ordinance.

Accordingly, the Board requests that the trial

court's order be affirmed.
Culbertson argues that this Court may simply strike the
vacation ordinance based on arguments not not presented to the
trial court for consideration.

Culbertson relies on Masters v.

Woosley, 777 P.2d 499 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

First, Masters does

not stand for the proposition that failure to comply with Rule
52(a) is "normally reversible error."

Instead, the court noted

that u in an appropriate case, failure to do so may justify remand
to the trial court."

id. at 501.

In fact, the general rules in

Utah is that non compliance with Rule 52 (a) is not reversible
error. See Retherford v. AT & T Communications, 844 P.2d 949, 958
n. 4 (Utah 1992).

Further, the plaintiff in Masters only sought

to challenge the trial court's grant of summary judgment, and did
not seek to obtain a ruling against the opposing party for the
first time on appeal.

Culbertson did not move for summary

judgment or judgment on the pleadings below.
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Because Culbertson

did not move for summary judgment on the validity of the vacation
ordinance, the trial court did not rule on it. See Ong
International v. 11th Avenue Corp.. 850 P.2d 447, 455 n. 31 (Utah
1993)("Our concern is whether an argument was addressed in the
first instance to the trial court.")

Therefore, Culbertson may

not now move to invalidate the vacation ordinance on appeal.
POINT V
THE ORDER CAN BE UPHELD UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF INVITED ERROR.
Assuming arguendo

the Order entered by the trial court was

in error, it was invited error on the part of Culbertson and
therefore is not properly subject to attack by Culbertson.
Court has stated that

xx

This

[a] party who leads a court into error

cannot later complain of that error to obtain reversal."

Merriam

v. Merriam, 799 P.2d 1172, 1175-1176 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). See
also Butler Crockett v. Pinecrest Pipeline, 909 P.2d 225, 235
(Utah 1995)(applying invited error doctrine based on statement of
counsel in open court) and Ludlow v. Colorado Animal By-Products
Co.. 137 P.2d 347, 354 (Utah 1943) ("A party who takes a position
which either leads a court into error or by conduct approves the
error committed by the court, cannot later take advantage of such
error. . . . " ) .
The statements and later silence of Culbertson's attorney
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led the trial court into entering the ruling that claims relating
to the vacation ordinance were dismissed with prejudice.
Culbertson's attorney had the opportunity to object to the trial
court's interpretation of his statements or to clarify them at
either the January 30, 1995 or March 29, 1995 hearing but chose
not to do so.

Accordingly, Culbertson may not now attack the

Order which was entered based on Culbertson's attorney's
representations to the trial court.
POINT VI
CULBERTSON'S CHALLENGES TO THE VACATION ORDINANCE ARE NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT.
Culbertson raises several arguments challenging the validity
of the vacation ordinance on appeal.

First, such claims have

been waived and abandoned by Culbertson in the trial court.
Second, affirmative attacks on the vacation ordinance are not
properly before this Court.
Culbertson argues that the vacation ordinances (1270 and
1275) are invalid because of the Board's alleged failure to
comply with U.C.A. § 17-27-810(1)(a).

This argument is raised

for the first time on appeal and is therefore not properly before
this Court.

See State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah

1985)("where a defendant fails to assert a particular ground . .
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. in the trial court, an appellate court will not consider that
ground on appeal.") and John Deere Co. v. A & H Equipment, Inc..
876 P.2d 880, 888 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).

Culbertson did not

challenge at the trial court the vacation ordinance based on the
Board's alleged non-compliance with section 810(1) (a).

Neither

did Culbertson submit a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking
to declare the ordinance invalid.

Therefore, Culbertson may only

appeal the trial court's dismissal of her claims with prejudice
and may not, in effect, seek summary judgment for the first time
on appeal.
In addition, Culbertson failed to comply with Rule 24(a)(5)
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure which requires a
citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved or in
the alternative a statement of the grounds for seeking review if
the issue was not properly preserved by the trial court.

See

Culbertson Brief, pages 1-2.
Culbertson's conduct in representing to the trial court
through counsel that the vacation ordinance would not be
challenged precluded the Board from presenting arguments in
support of the vacation ordinance.

See Turtle Management, Inc.

v. Haggis Management, 645 P.2d 667, 672 (Utah 1982)(despite the
fact that issue raised in pleading
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xx

[t]his Court will not

consider on appeal issues which were not submitted to the trial
court and concerning which the trial court did not have the
opportunity to make any finding of fact or law.")

Because

Culbertson waived and abandoned claims relating to the vacation
ordinance, the Board did not persist in presenting arguments to
the trial court in support of its validity.
Such arguments would include the fact that the alleged
failure to comply with Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-810(1) (a) (1995)
does not affect the validity of the Board's actions.

Utah

appellate courts have consistently held that time limitations on
governmental actions are directory and not jurisdictional

u

if it

is 'given with a view merely to the proper orderly and prompt
conduct of business, and by the failure to obey no prejudice will
occur to those whose rights are protected by the statute.'" Cache
County v. Property Tax Division, 296 Utah Adv. Rep. 33 (Utah
1996)(citing 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 25.03 (4th
Ed.)).

In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d

705 (Utah 1978) the Utah Supreme Court addressed whether
statutory provisions "regarding the time period in which the
board of county commissioners must perform its statutory duty in
levying a property tax, are directory or mandatory."

The court

reiterated the general rule as set forth in the early case of
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State ex rel. Wright v. Park City School District, 133 P. 128,
129, 43 Utah 61, 66 (1913):
The general rule is that a statute,
prescribing the time within which public
officials are required to perform an official
act, is directory only, unless it contains
negative words denying the exercise of the
power after the time specified or the nature
of the act to be performed, or the language
used by the Legislature shows that the
designation of time was intended as a
limitation . . . .
Under the above-cited case law, any failure to comply with
17-27-810 (1995) by the Board does not invalidate the ordinance.
Case law cited by Culbertson from the area of redevelopment law
is inapplicable.

The vacation of a public road is not in

derogation of an individual's property rights.

The strict rule

of statutory construction in the area of redevelopment law arises
from the use of condemnation procedures against landowners.
Here, the Board did not initiate condemnation proceedings against
Culbertson.
The trial court also did not address the propriety of the
notice provided due to Culbertson7s waiver and abandonment of her
challenge to the vacation ordinance5.

5

However, Culbertson7s

Culbertson did challenge the propriety of the notice in
her amended complaint but did not present the argument to the
trial court by way of summary judgment motion. Culbertson did

40

claim that she did not receive adequate notice is not supported
by case law or the record.

Culbertson relies on Nelson v. Provo

City, 872 P.2d 35 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) which is distinguishable.
In Nelson, the "City mailed no notice of the vacation to the
abutting landowners either before or after the fact." id. at 36.
Not surprisingly, the Court held:
Here, City did not notify abutting
landowners, nor did it notify its citizens
generally pursuant to statute. In fact, the
single published notice ran after the
purported vacation. Thus, City's notice was
not only insufficient, it was timely.
Id. at 38.
Conversely, the Board properly sent and published notice of
the proposed vacation.

(R. 352-353).

In fact, Culbertson's

attorney was present and participated in the hearing considering
the proposed vacation.

(R. 359-360).

Utah's statutory scheme

regarding land use decisions only require notice of the public
hearing to consider the proposed vacation.

The Board complied

with these notice requirements codified in U.C.A. § 17-27-808 &
809 (1995).

In addition, the Board complied with the notice

suggest in her memorandum opposing summary judgment that she did
not receive notice of the August 10, 1995 decision. However, she
did not move to invalidate the ordinance on that basis.
Therefore, the argument is in effect, raised for the first time
on appeal.
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requirements generally applicable to ordinances.

See U.C.A. §

17-15-1 (1995).
The final improper challenge to the vacation ordinance is
that the trial court improperly shifted responsibility for
complying with the applicable statutory requirements.
court did no such thing.

The trial

The trial court dismissed Culbertson's

claims relating to the vacation ordinance based on her attorney's
own statements.

As for the notice requirements, the Board

complied with the notice requirements set forth in U.C.A. § 1717-808 & 809 (1995) as well as U.C.A. § 17-15-1 (1995).
This appeal is an improper attempt to revisit an issue
abandoned long ago.

To allow Culbertson to pursue an attack on

the road vacation ordinance would unfairly prejudice the Board.
The Board had a right to rely on the in court representations of
Culbertson7s attorney.

Culbertson should not now be allowed to

back out on statements made in court to both to the Board's
attorney and the trial court.
CONCLUSION
The Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this
appeal.

Culbertson failed to file a timely notice of appeal.

Further, the objections submitted prior to entry of order do not
constitute a proper post-judgment motion which tolls the thirty
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day limit on filing notice of appeals.

The Board requests that

Culbertson's appeal be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction for failure to file a timely notice of appeal.
The trial court correctly dismissed claims relating to the
road vacation ordinance with prejudice based on Culbertson's
counsel's in court waiver and abandonment of such claims.

In the

alternative, the doctrine of invited error applies to sustain the
order.

Culbertson's attacks on the vacation ordinance are not

properly before the Court.

Therefore, the Board requests that

the trial court's order be affirmed and Culbertson's appeal
dismissed.
Finally, the Board joins in and incorporates by reference
the arguments made by Commissioners Overson and Horiuchi relating
to the vacation ordinance and the trial court's dismissal of
claims relating to the ordinance as well as the arguments
relating to Culbertson's untimely notice of appeal.
DATED this }Lu

day of February, 1997.

DOUGLAS R. SHORT
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY

Patrick F. Holden
Deputy County Attorney
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ght appeal as matter of right. Jensen v.
, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2d 906 (1968).
^denying a motion for summary judg} not a final order and was not appealv. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc.,
g2d 1359 (Utah 1977).
r judgment in favor of one defenftone is not a final judgment where the
-against the remaining defendant re~
Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d
JUtah 1983).
minute entry.
[jjnsigned minute entry did not constitute

Rule 4

an entry of judgment, nor was it a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Wilson v. Manning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 1982); Utah State
Tax Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah
1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah
1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979
(Utah 1986).
An unsigned minute entry does not constitute a final order for purposes of appeal State
v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987).
Cited in Huston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531
(Utah 1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478
(Utah Ct. App. 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
. — Appealability of order suspending
sition or execution of sentence, 51
L4th 939.

le 4. Appeal as of right: when taken.
$) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal
emitted as a matter of rightfromthe trial court to the appellate court, the
tice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial
"" ; within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed
However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible
or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3
[ be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of
of the judgment or order appealed from.
t>) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah
les of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judgment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional
lgs of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be reif the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the
lent; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all
ies shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting
^denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the
Jteh Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1)
ler Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judgnt, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for
^parties shall nm from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grantgig or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the
p&position of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of
pie order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above.
^ (c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in
fiaragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of
jtoe trial court shall be treated asfiledafter such entry and on the day thereof.
* (d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date
Pa which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise
^escribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. ^ (e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal
open motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time
^scribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motionfiledbefore expiration of the
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires.
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given
to the other narties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court.

Rule 4
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No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 daysfromthe
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Administrative actions.
Attorney fees.
Cross-appeaL
Extension of time to appeal.
—Amendment or modification of judgment.
Filing of notice.
Filing with county clerk.
Final order or judgment.
Post-judgment motions.
Premature notice.
Reconsideration of order.
Timeliness of notice.
—Date of notice.
Cited.
Administrative actions.
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for
review of administrative actions. Mavenk
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
Attorney fees.
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in defending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v.
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981).
Cross-appeaL
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-appeal, a respondent may not attack the judgment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4).
Extension of time to appeal
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the
court power to extend a time limit where a failure to act in time is due to excusable neglect
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., authorizing the court to relieve from final judgment
for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies
where a notice of appeal has not been timely
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466
P.2d 843 (1970).
A party could not extend the time for filing
an appeal simply by filing a Motion for Reconsideration of Order Striking Petition and Motion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v.
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980).
When the question of "excusable neglect"
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard contemplated thereby is a strict one; it is not
meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situations only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984).
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v.
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Proper remedy of defendant whose cross-appeal was not timely filed under Subdivision (d),
upon having the notice returned, was to file a
motion to extend time with the district court
under Subdivision (e); the appellate court could
not consider such a motion, or grant an exten-

sion, on appeal. Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
—Amendment or modification of judg.
ment.
If an amendment or modification does not
change the substance or character of a judg.
ment, it does not enlarge the time for appeal
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App;
1994).
Filing of notice.
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal.
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983).
Filing with county clerk.
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely
filing with the juvenile court, where there waa
no indication when the clerk transmitted a
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile
court, and the original was returned to aopellant's counsel. State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Final order ;>r judgment.
Where the tnai court signed two different
judgments but neither party served his prepared judgment on the other party before submitting it to the court, the filing of either judgment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken
from either is premature because the judgments are not properly "final." Larsen v.
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983).
Juvenile court's order for temporary confinement in a youth facility for observation and
assessment prior to a final disposition was not
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it
did not finally dispose of all issues, including
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's
rights as parental custodian. State, In re
T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988).
An unsigned minute entry is not a final
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment,
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts
to run on the date when the trial court enters
its first signed order denying the motion
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah
1990).
A signed minute entry ordering defendant's
counsel to prepare an order showing that plaintiffs post-judgment motions filed pursuant tc
Rules 52(b) and 59, U.R.C.P., were denied was
not a final appealable order. Swenson Assocs
Architects v. State, 254 Utah Adv. Rep. S
(Utah 1994).
Post-judgment motions.
Where a post-judgment motion was timelj
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., to upset the
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judgment were filed after the motion was made, bu1
before the disposition of the motion, the motior
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, anc
notice of appeal had to be filed within the required time from the date of the entry thai
disposed of the motion. U-M Invs. v. Ray, 65£
P.2d 1186 (Utah 1982).
The time for appeal of an order confirming
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Rule 52

-to prove permanence of injuries and to or reflecting on integrity or intelligence of ju' ^instructions to jury thereon, 18 rors, 41 A.L.R.3d 1154.
£1*170.
Construction of statutes or rules making
,riety and effect, in eminent domain pro- mandatory the use of pattern or uniform aptt of instruction to the jury as to land- P1™*1 ^
i n a c t i o n s , 49 AX.R.3d 128.
^ w i l l i n g n e s s to sell property, 20 + Necessity'and propriety^of instructing onal*1081
temative theories of negligence or breach of
7.1
1~ mstructions
;„«+~,^™, in
;„ cml
^™i case
~<™ warranty, where instruction on strict liability
Bet-urging
duct8 l i a b m
52
jig desirability and importance of agree- ^ ^ £ o a 101
r
S8 A.L.R3d 1281.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, construclict-urging instructions in civil case tion and effect of provision m Rule 51, ajid aiming on weight of majority view or au- tfar gtate rules, that counsel be given opportucompromise, 41 A.L.R.3d 845.
nity to make objections to instructions out of
licfc-urging instructions in civil case ad- hearing of jury, 1 A.L.R. Fed. 310.
I jurors to refrain from intransigence
Key Numbers. — Trial *=» 182 to 296.

le 52. Findings by the court.
Effect* In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an
;6ry jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its
lusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule
i; in granting or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall simi' set forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute the
grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary for purposes of
review. Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence,
Shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given
Igphe opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.
The findings of a master, to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be
considered as the findings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of
fket and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of
decision filed by the court. The trial court need not enter findings of fact and
conclusions of law in rulings on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The
fiSSrt shall, however, issue a brief written statement of the ground for its
lecision on all motions granted under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59
when the motion is based on more than one ground.
(b) Amendment* Upon motion of a party made not later than 10 days after
entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly. The motion i^ay be made with
amotion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made
in actions tried by the court without a jury, the question of the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the findings may thereafter be raised whether or not
the party raising the question has made in the district court an objection to
such findings or has made either a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion for a new trial.
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Except in actions
for divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of law may be waived by the
parties to an issue of fact:
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the trial;
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause;
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in the minutes.
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 52, F.R.C.P.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Adoption.
—Abandonment of contract.
—-Advisory verdict.
—Breach of contract.

—Child custody.
—Credibility of witnesses.
—Denial of motion.
—Divorce decree modifications.
—Easement.
—Evidentiary disputes.

